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Catherine Anne Brown*  Treaty Shopping and the New
Joseph Bogle** Multilateral Tax Agreement—Is it
 Business as Usual in Canada?
On 1 January 2020 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Multilateral Convention (MLI) entered into effect for many of Canada’s tax 
treaties. New provisions introduced by the MLI, speci cally the principal purpose 
test (PPT) and a new preamble, raised concerns that the bar to deny treaty bene ts 
would be substantially lower than the bar previously set by Canada’s General Anti-
Avoidance Rule (GAAR). This paper considers how the MLI will impact access to 
treaty bene ts in Canada by applying the new MLI measures to treaty shopping 
cases previously challenged under the GAAR. The paper concludes that application 
of the PPT by Canadian courts will result in similar outcomes in these cases. In 
short, the MLI will arrive ‘with a whimper and not a bang’ in Canada. The MLI’s 
most signi cant impact on Canadian international tax law will be the patchwork 
quilt of tax avoidance regimes that will govern Canada’s tax treaties in the future.
La Convention multilatérale (IM) , née de l’Initiative de l’OCDE e vue de prévenir 
l’érosion de la base d’imposition et le transfert des béné ces (BEPS) et lutter contre 
l’évasion  scale internationale, est entrée en vigueur au Canada le 1er décembre 
2019. L’IM entraînera des modi cations à de nombreuses conventions  scales 
du Canada, notamment l’ajout de nouvelles mesures pour contrer les stratégies 
d’évitement  scal. Il est généralement admis que ces mesures abaisseront 
considérablement la barre pour éliminer les avantages des conventions  scales 
qui avait été  xée par la règle générale anti-évitement (RGAE) du Canada, et 
remettront en question le statu quo selon lequel, à des  ns  scales, le « chalandage 
 scal » n’est pas en soi « intrinsèquement correct ou incorrect .» Le présent article 
remet en question cette conclusion.  Le principal changement qui sera apporté par 
l’IM aux 93 conventions  scales du Canada consistera en une série de régimes 
d’évitement  scal différents selon qu’il s’agit d’une convention couverte  ou non et 
selon les mesures d’évitement  scal spéci ques qu’elle adopte. 
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** Law Student, University of Calgary, JD 2020.
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Introduction
The Multilateral Convention (MLI),1 born out of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Base Erosion and 
Pro t Shifting Initiative (BEPS) to combat international tax avoidance, 
entered into force in Canada on 1 December 2019.2 The MLI changes many 
of Canada’s tax treaties by adding new measures to counter tax avoidance 
strategies.3 It is widely thought that these measures will substantially 
lower the bar to deny tax treaty bene ts that had been set by Canada’s 
1. OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Pro t Shifting (Paris: OECD, 2016).
2. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development, Status of List of Reservations 
and Noti cations at the Time of Signature (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Trade and Development, 30 May 
2017) [List of Reservations].
3. Canada, Parliament, Debates of the Senate, 42-1, vol 150, No 286 (9 May 2019) at 8062.
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general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and challenge the status quo that, for 
tax purposes, ‘treaty shopping’ is not in and of itself “inherently proper or 
improper.”4   
In this paper we beg to differ. In the absence of a clear international 
meaning or interpretive principles, the new minimum standard introduced 
by the MLI will achieve the same results in a pre- and post-MLI regime 
in Canada in most treaty shopping arrangements. The main change that 
will be introduced to Canada’s 93 tax treaties by the MLI will be an array 
of different tax avoidance regimes depending on whether the treaty is a 
covered agreement5 and the speci c tax avoidance measures it adopts. 
The paper is divided into two parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
the key components in the tax avoidance regime in Canada in the post-
MLI regime. Part II explores the potential impact of the MLI in three 
hypotheticals. Two are based on past treaty cases that were unsuccessfully 
challenged by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).6 The third considers 
the future of double-dip  nancing structures under Canada’s covered 
agreements. Part III offers some conclusions. 
I. The legal landscape 
One of the primary goals of the MLI is to prevent treaty abuse, including 
treaty shopping. Treaty shopping generally refers to tax arrangements 
designed to access treaty bene ts that are not available directly.7 It occurs 
when the taxpayer is not entitled to the bene ts of a tax treaty but can 
make use of another juristic person, for example an intervening holding 
company, to obtain those bene ts.
Under current Canadian law, treaty shopping in and of itself is not 
considered to be inherently improper or abusive.8 To qualify as abusive, the 
4. MIL (Investments) SA v Canada, 2006 TCC 460 at para 72, TCJ No 362 [MIL Investments].
5. Covered tax agreements are those treaties each country lists in their Status of List of Reservations 
and Noti cations to the OECD to which the MLI will apply. Instead of changing each individual 
agreement, the MLI lives beside the treaties and adjusts elements to certain minimum standards. 84 
of Canada’s 93 tax treaties are listed in Canada’s noti cation to the OECD to which the minimum 
standard will apply. See Appendix A for a table of Canada’s listed covered agreements.
6. MIL Investments, supra note 4; Prévost Car Inc v Canada, 2008 TCC 231 [Prevost Car].
7. Alta Energy Luxembourg SARL v Canada¸ 2018 TCC 152, TCJ No 124 [Alta Energy] at para 
92 the Court highlighted the OECD Glossary of Tax Terms de nition: “An analysis of tax treaty 
provisions to structure an international transaction or operation so as to take advantage of a particular 
tax treaty.” The decision of the Tax Court was af rmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Alta Energy 
Luxembourg SARL v Canada, 2020 FCA 43, FCJ No 204 [Alta Energy FCA].
8. In Crown Forest, the SCC stated in obiter that there is nothing improper if a taxpayer actively 
seeks to limit their tax liability by selecting international tax regimes most bene cial to them, see 
Crown Forest Industries Ltd v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 802 at paras 49 and 50. This view, that there is 
nothing inherently proper or improper about treaty shopping was repeated in MIL Investments, supra 
note 4. Most recently, the Federal Court of Appeal further clari ed that it is how a treaty is used that 
mut be examined to determine whether the transaction is abusive, see Alta Energy FCA, supra note 7 
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transaction or series would have to achieve an outcome that the provision 
was intended to prevent, defeat the underlying rationale of the provision, 
and/or circumvent the provision in a manner that frustrates or defeats its 
object, spirit or purpose.9
The primary tool to  ght treaty shopping in Canada currently is the 
GAAR. A key factor in applying the GAAR to deny a bene t is that the 
bene t would result directly or indirectly in an abuse having regard to 
those provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.10  This requires the court to 
go behind the words of the legislation to determine the object, spirit or 
purpose of the provision or provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.
While the GAAR gives wide discretion to the CRA to challenge the 
decisions of a taxpayer, the Supreme Court has stated that the use of the 
words  “abuse and misuse” should not be understood as “implying moral 
opprobrium regarding the actions of a taxpayer to minimize tax liability…
taxpayers are entitled to select courses of action or enter into transactions 
that will minimize their tax liability.” The Supreme Court has also stated 
that the GAAR can only be applied to deny a tax bene t when the abusive 
nature of the transaction is clear.11
To date, the Minister has suffered an unbroken line of defeats in 
applying the GAAR in a treaty shopping context. It is now generally 
accepted in Canada that a vague general policy against ‘treaty shopping’ 
cannot support a GAAR based  nding of treaty abuse.12As discussed 
further below the MLI introduces a new anti-avoidance provision that 
many anticipate will substantially lower the bar set by the GAAR to deny 
treaty bene ts.
1. The MLI
The MLI will apply to each country’s “covered tax agreements.” As a 
signatory to the MLI, Canada has agreed to include the proposed minimum 
standards among other measures, which include a new preamble that 
speci cally references treaty-shopping arrangements, and to introduce a 
at para 78 quoting the Tax Court in MIL Investments.
9. Copthorne Holdings Ltd v Canada, 2011 SCC 63, 3 SCR 721 at para 72 [Copthorne].
10. The GAAR has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as “a legal mechanism whereby 
Parliament has conferred on the court the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation 
to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions relied upon by the taxpayer. 
While the taxpayer’s transactions will be in strict compliance with the text of the relevant provisions 
relied upon, they may not necessarily be in accord with their object, spirit or purpose. In such cases, 
the GAAR may be invoked by the Minister.” See Copthorne, supra note 9 at para 66. 
11. Ibid at para 68, quoting their previous decision in Trustco.
12. Although it is now arguable that the anti-avoidance measures introduced by the MLI could alter 
the abuse/misuse analysis under the Canadian GAAR. In our view it is unlikely this will be the case. 
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principal purpose test (the PPT) to deny a bene t under the treaty unless 
the bene t is in line with the object and purpose of the treaty.13 
There is controversy about the legal effect of the change to the 
preamble of Canada’s tax treaties. The Vienna Convention explicitly 
mandates that the context or the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise the whole of the treaty including the preamble.14 This is 
also the OECD’s position on the interpretation of tax treaties, but this 
view has been challenged by numerous courts in Canada and in other 
jurisdictions.15 While it may be arguable the new preamble may in uence 
the GAAR analysis, the GAAR will be rendered largely redundant in 
Canadian covered agreements and supplanted by the PPT or detailed 
limitation on bene t provisions (DLOB).
The potentially signi cant change to Canada’s covered tax agreements 
is the introduction of the PPT, which provides as follows:
 Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a bene t 
under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an 
item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard 
to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that bene t was 
one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that 
resulted directly or indirectly in that bene t, unless it is established that 
granting that bene t in these circumstances would be in accordance with 
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax 
Agreement.16
The PPT appears to introduce a much lower bar than the GAAR to deny a 
treaty bene t.17 However this will depend largely on how Canadian courts 
apply the new test. There is no de nition of the PPT in the treaty, nor 
international understanding about how the PPT is to be interpreted. As one 
13. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Pro t Shifting, 24 November 2016, OECD art 6 [MLI]. The preamble of covered tax agreements will 
be modi ed to include the following language: “Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect 
to the taxes covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced 
taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at 
obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect bene t of residents of third jurisdictions).” 
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex), 23 May 1969, No 18232 art 31(2). 
15. This was explicitly addressed in MIL Investments¸ where the Minister unsuccessfully attempted 
to use the preamble to the Canada–Luxembourg Treaty as an anti-abuse provision. See also Claire Peng 
and Josef Schuch, “The Relevance of the Preamble for Treaty Entitlements,” Tax Treaty Entitlement 
(Vienna: IBFD, 2019) 1 at 8-11 [Relevance of the Preamble] who state, “the usefulness of preambles 
is limited no matter how well drafted because its interpretation is limited to substantive provisions.” 
16. MLI, supra note 13 at art 7(1). 
17. Under the GAAR, the CRA must demonstrate abusive avoidance. Under the PPT, the CRA must 
demonstrate only that “one of the principal purposes of an arrangement or transaction was to achieve a 
tax bene t.” It is then up to the taxpayer to establish that granting the bene t is in line with the object 
and purpose of the relevant treaty provision. 
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EU scholar recently noted, EU courts will take the OECD commentary 
into consideration, but they will also “create their own world” based on 
recent case law.18 In the end, however, the test is whether the transaction or 
arrangement is in accordance with the object and purposes of the relevant 
provision(s), a test that is very familiar in Canadian tax jurisprudence. 
Because there is no de nition in the treaty, each country, including Canada, 
may turn to its domestic law to determine the meaning of the language 
used in the PPT.19 
The introduction of the PPT into Canada’s covered agreements is 
an interim measure. The Canadian government has noted that it intends 
to adopt DLOB provisions to replace or supplement the PPT through 
negotiations with treaty partners.20 To date only Canada’s treaty with the 
United States includes a DLOB provision.21 In effect, that DLOB provision 
denies treaty bene ts to a non-qualifying person, thus providing a direct 
route to the denial of treaty bene ts.22 
The MLI came into effect for many of Canada’s covered agreements on 
1 January 2020. It is important to understand how it will impact Canada’s 
current tax avoidance regime. In essence, different tax avoidance rules will 
apply depending on the other country involved. Countries included under 
Canada’s covered agreements will be subject to the new avoidance regime 
under the MLI.23 Countries with non-covered tax treaties will remain 
subject to existing tax treaty rules. All countries, including those with 
which Canada does not have a tax treaty will remain subject to Canada’s 
domestic rules including the GAAR. 
Canada’s arsenal to combat tax avoidance will therefore include 
speci c domestic anti-avoidance rules and the GAAR, speci c and general 
treaty anti-avoidance rules, and if the treaty is a covered agreement, the 
PPT. These provisions are discussed further below.
18. Prof. Dr. Dennis Webber, University of Amsterdam, De Universiteit Van Amsterdam “The PPT 
and the EU abuse doctrine” (PowerPoint delivered at the Amsterdam Centre for Tax Law full day 
conference, 3 May 2019) [unpublished] slides 134-159.
19. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, (OECD 
Publishing 2017) at art 3 [OECD Model].
20. List of Reservations, supra note 2 at 16. 
21. Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital, United States and Canada, 26 September 1980, at art XXIX A [Canada–US Treaty]. 
22. Ibid at art XXIX A (2): qualifying persons include a natural person, Government or its political 
subdivisions, public companies, private companies and trusts with speci c ownership quali cations, 
estates, non-pro ts with quali cations, and exempt organizations in art XXI.
23. See Appendix A.
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2. Canada’s tax avoidance provisions
In addition to the GAAR, there are several SAARS, or speci c anti-
avoidance rules in the Income Tax Act (ITA).24 These include transfer 
pricing, surplus stripping, thin capitalization and back-to-back arrangement 
rules, as well as the foreign af liate regime. These rules supersede the 
GAAR in application.25 It is likely that the new PPT test will apply after 
the application of domestic rules, but it is not precluded from superseding 
them.26
Many of Canada’s treaties also contain speci c anti-avoidance rules 
to deny treaty bene ts. The MLI may alter these speci c rules in covered 
agreements. However, non-covered agreements, including the tax treaty 
with the United States will not be impacted and will remain subject to their 
own unique rules.
While Canada has traditionally opted not to include DLOB provisions 
in its tax treaties, it has included what have been referred to as modi ed 
limitations on bene ts provisions (MLOB)27 in 14 of its existing treaties.28
The current provisions in 13 of these treaties will be modi ed by the MLI 
and replaced with the PPT.  This should have little practical effect on the 
outcome in treaty shopping cases given the similarity of the PPT to the 
prior provisions.29 
Of Canada’s 93 existing tax treaties, 43 also contain a speci c anti-
conduit provision.30 This provision effectively denies a treaty bene t 
24. Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [Act].
25. Jinyan Li & Arthur Cock eld, International Taxation in Canada, 4th Ed (Toronto: Lexis Nexus) 
at 388. The GAAR is a rule of last resort for the competent authorities and should only apply in the 
absence or failure of a SAAR.
26. David G Duff, “International Tax Planning” (2018) 66:4 Canadian Tax J 947-1011 at 960 
[International Tax Planning]. As noted by Duff, the purpose of domestic rules is to characterize 
transactions or arrangements and so they are likely to apply before the PPT. But authorities do not 
necessarily have to rely on domestic anti-avoidance rules. This could allow for situations where the 
PPT applies before speci c ITA anti-avoidance rules. 
27. MLOB provisions deny access to articles of tax treaties where the main purpose or one of the 
main purposes was to take advantage of the treaty article. It is generally worded as: “the provisions 
of this Article shall not apply if it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person 
concerned with the creation or assignment of the shares or other rights in respect of which the dividend 
is paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.”
28. Chile, Colombia, Estonia, Hong Kong, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Poland, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
29. While there are slight variations between the MLOB rules in each treaty, the core rule is the 
same. The provision effectively denies treaty withholding rates on dividends, interest, and royalties 
where one of the main purposes of a person is to obtain bene ts under the treaty.
30. Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland, Republic of the Ivory 
Coast, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkey,  Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
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where an entity is a resident of a territory, but its bene cial owner is a non-
resident and the entity is subject to a lower tax rate than similar entities 
with resident owners.31 
Canada has not noti ed the OECD of the provisions, nor listed the 
treaties containing the provision. Whether the treaty is a covered tax 
agreement under the MLI or a non-covered treaty, the provision will 
therefore remain in force and effect. As the more speci c rule, this 
provision is most likely to be applied before the PPT to deny a bene t in 
covered tax agreements. 
Finally, there is the question of a general anti-avoidance provision in 
a tax treaty. The only non-covered agreement with Canada that contains 
a general anti-avoidance rule as a distinct provision is the tax treaty with 
Germany.32 As discussed, the MLI will add the PPT as a general anti-
avoidance rule to all of Canada’s covered agreements once it is rati ed.
3. The future 
Over the next decade, Canada may have up to  ve different tax avoidance 
regimes governing its tax treaties and a sixth governing transactions with 
non-treaty countries. In all cases, domestic speci c anti-avoidance rules 
will apply to the extent they do not con ict with treaty rules. As Canada 
embraces the PPT, it will likely act as a broad general anti-avoidance 
provision where speci c ITA rules, treaty speci c rules, and the GAAR 
fail to achieve the desired result. It has also been suggested that the CRA 
may skip application of the GAAR and use the PPT as their primary 
challenger.33
31.  Arrangement Between the Canadian Trade Of ce in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Of ce in Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Canada and Taiwan, 15 January 2016, at art 26(3): “The 
Arrangement will not apply to any company, trust or other entity that is a resident of a territory and is 
bene cially owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons who are not residents 
of that territory, if the amount of the tax imposed on the income of the company, trust or other entity 
by the government of that territory is substantially lower than the amount that would be imposed by 
the government of that territory (after taking into account any reduction or offset of the amount of tax 
in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contribution, credit, or allowance to the company, 
trust or partnership, or to any other person) if all of the shares of the capital stock of the company or all 
of the interests in the trust or other entity, as the case may be, were bene cially owned by one or more 
individuals who were residents of that territory.” 
32. Art 29(6) of the treaty provides “nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as preventing a 
Contracting State from denying bene ts under the Agreement where it can reasonably be concluded 
that to do otherwise would result in an abuse of the provisions of the Agreement or of the domestic 
laws of that State.” Canada and Germany have been in negotiations since June of 2017. It is expected 
that the treaty will become a covered tax agreement when negotiations are complete, and a new treaty 
has been rati ed. It remains to be seen if the general anti-avoidance provision will be carried over into 
the new agreement.
33. International Tax Planning, supra note 26 at 960.
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Table 1:  Rule Order of Application in the Canadian Treaties
Type of Treaty Rule Order of Application
Covered MLI Agreements (PPT) 1. Domestic Speci c Rules
2. Tax Treaty Provisions (including 
bene cial ownership and the PPT)
3. GAAR
Covered MLI Agreements 
(Limitation on Bene ts (LOB))
1. Domestic Speci c Rules
2. LOB
3. GAAR
Covered MLI Agreements (LOB 
and PPT)




Canada–US Tax Treaty 1. Domestic Speci c Rules 
2. Article XXIX A (DLOB)
3. Canada: GAAR / US: Substance 
over form 
Non-MLI Treaties 1. Domestic Speci c Rules 
2. Tax Treaty Provisions (including 
bene cial ownership and LOB if 
applicable) 
3. GAAR
No Tax Treaty 1. Domestic Rules
2. GAAR (if possible)
When DLOB provisions are negotiated into Canada’s treaties this is likely 
to change the treaties once more. The covered agreements will look more 
like Canada’s treaty with the United States where tax treaty bene ts will be 
subject to a detailed uniform standard less reliant on general anti-avoidance 
rules. Canada’s non-MLI treaties will remain subject to the current regime 
relying on domestic rules and speci c anti-avoidance provisions in the tax 
treaty, and non-treaty countries will remain subject to speci c domestic 
rules and the GAAR.
II. Application of Canada’s anti-avoidance provisions 
 In order to demonstrate Canada’s anti-avoidance rules in operation, this 
section of the paper explores the application of the existing and the new 
MLI regime in three hypotheticals. The hypotheticals are examined 
from the Canadian perspective. It may also be necessary to consider 
the transaction(s) from the perspective of the other treaty partner and to 
consider whether the tax regime in the tax partner’s country includes a 
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speci c or general anti-avoidance rule that would apply to the proposed 
arrangement.34 
1. Hypothetical 1
Hypothetical 1 is loosely based on the facts in MIL Investments,35 one of 
the  rst tax treaty decisions challenged under the Canadian GAAR. The 
facts and the Court’s reasoning provide a useful framework to examine the 
potential outcome under current Canadian law and the MLI.
In MIL Investments, the taxpayer (MIL) was incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands by a non-resident shareholder.36 Following a series of 
transactions including the sale of a small percentage of its holdings in 
Canco (a Canadian corporation), MIL migrated from the Caymans to 
Luxembourg.37 Shortly thereafter, MIL tendered its remaining Canco 
shares to Inco (the  nal sale) and realized a $426 million gain. At the time 
of this transaction, the shares were considered taxable Canadian property. 
However, under the Canada–Luxembourg Treaty, gains from the sale of a 
Canco’s shares by a Luxembourg resident were taxable in Canada only if 
the shares were part of a substantial interest in the Canco.38 At the time of 
34. Since Prevost Car was decided, the EU has brought ATAD, or the EU Anti-Avoidance doctrine, 
into effect. This has the potential to in uence their approach to the interpretation of the treaty 
provisions and application of the PPT. 
35. MIL Investments, supra note 4.
36. Non-treaty jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands were popular for tax planning due to their 
favorable tax regimes. There is growing evidence that this trend may soon end. New domestic rules in 
the Cayman Islands require that businesses maintain a degree of physical presence. Under pressure from 
the British Government and the European Union the Cayman Islands enacted an Economic Substance 
Law effective 1 January 2019 requiring companies operating in the Cayman Islands to maintain “a 
level of operational substance that is effectively commensurate with the income generating activities 
of that company.” The Cayman Government has mandated an annual reporting obligation as of 2020 
requiring companies to report their compliance with the new rules, see Bonn Liu et al, “New Cayman 
Islands Economic Substance Law is a Potential Game Changer for International Business” KPMG, 
Insights (19 March 2019), online: KPMG Insights <https://home.kpmg/cn/en/home/insights/2019/03/
new-cayman-islands-economic-substance-law.html> [https://perma.cc/QZ3A-QAC3]. Also of note, 
the British Crown Dependencies of Guernsey, Mann, and Jersey signed the MLI on 7 June 2017, and 
it came into force regarding their handful of covered tax agreements between June and 1 July 2019. 
See OECD, Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Pro t Shifting, Status as of 9 April 2019, at 2-3.
37. Originally, MIL owned 11.9% and Mr. B about 0.5% of the shares of Diamond Field Resources 
Ltd. (Canco), a Canadian public corporation. In June 1995, MIL rolled 2.6% of its Canco shares to 
Inco Limited, another Canadian public corporation, for Inco shares. This reduced MIL’s direct holding 
in Canco to about 9.3% (9.8% combined with Mr. B’s holding). A month later, MIL migrated from 
the Caymans to Luxembourg, and the following month disposed of its Inco shares claiming a treaty 
exemption.
38. A substantial interest was 10 percent or more. MIL, a Luxembourg resident who directly owned 
less than 10% of the Canco shares when they were tendered to Inco for the  nal sale; claimed the treaty 
exemption, see Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, Canada and Luxembourg, 10 September 1999, at art 13(4)(a). 
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the  nal sale MIL no longer held a substantial interest under the treaty and 
claimed the treaty exemption.
The Tax Court held that the  nal sale was not part of the series and 
that none of the transactions, including the  nal sale were avoidance 
transactions.39 Therefore, there was no need to analyze whether any of the 
transactions were abusive. On appeal, MIL admitted that its continuance 
as a Luxembourg corporation was an avoidance transaction. As a result, 
the tax bene t that MIL ultimately obtained was subject to the GAAR 
if the sale was part of the series of transactions or was undertaken in 
contemplation of the series of transactions and there was abuse. The 
Federal Court of Appeal found no support for the CRA’s argument that 
the tax bene t obtained by MIL was an abuse or misuse of the object and 
purpose of the treaty or the ITA.
For purposes of the hypothetical discussion, assume a non-resident 
taxpayer (NRT) transfers shares that are taxable Canadian property to a 
holding company (Holdco) in the Cayman Islands.40 Within the same year, 
Holdco agrees to exchange a portion of its shares for those of a third party 
on a rollover basis, lowering its holdings in Canco. Months later, Holdco 
is continued to Country X. The shareholders of Canco, including Holdco, 
vote to allow the third party to acquire Canco. Holdco realizes a signi cant 
capital gain of $500 million (CAD) on the disposition of the Canco shares. 
In the discussion that follows, Country X is respectively a non-treaty 
country, a country with a non-covered treaty, and a country with a covered 
treaty under the MLI. 
a. Non-treaty country 
A non-resident is liable to tax on the disposition of taxable Canadian 
property.41 Although listed on a designated stock exchange, the Canco 
39. MIL Investments, supra note 4 at paras 69 and 70. 
40. Act, supra note 24 at s 248(1) “taxable Canadian property.” 
41. Act, supra note 24 at ss 2(3)(c) and 248(1) “taxable Canadian property” of a taxpayer at any 
time in a taxation year means a property of the taxpayer that is (e) a share of the capital stock of a 
corporation that is listed on a designated stock exchange, a share of the capital stock of a mutual fund 
corporation or a unit of a mutual fund trust, if, at any particular time during the 60-month period that 
ends at that time, 
(i) 25% or more of the issued shares of any class of the capital stock of the corporation, or 
25% or more of the issued units of the trust, as the case may be, were owned by or belonged 
to one or any combination of
(A) the taxpayer,
(B) persons with whom the taxpayer did not deal at arm’s length, and
(C) partnerships in which the taxpayer or a person referred to in clause (B) holds a 
membership interest directly or indirectly through one or more partnerships, and
(ii) more than 50% of the fair market value of the share or unit, as the case may be, was 
derived directly or indirectly from one or any combination of properties described under 
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shares are taxable Canadian property if Holdco holds 25% or more of 
the issued shares (of any class) of Canco, and greater than 50% of the 
value of the shares is derived directly or indirectly from real or immovable 
property within a  ve-year period. Assume Holdco holds 29% of shares in 
Canco, and a year later this is reduced to 20%. The shares remain taxable 
Canadian property and any gain is taxable in Canada. Unlike the facts in 
MIL Investments, there is no applicable tax treaty that would exempt the 
gain from tax in Canada. Therefore, there would be no need for the CRA 
to resort to the GAAR. 
If Holdco’s ownership in Canco remained below 25% for a  ve-
year period, the gain on the disposition of the Canco shares would be 
exempt in Canada.42 The tax bene t, (no taxation), was explicitly allowed 
by parliament when they rede ned taxable Canadian property in 2010 
to promote greater investment into Canada.43 Thus a reduction in share 
ownership to meet the exemption is in-line with the object, spirit, and 
purpose of the provision. Without abuse of a provision of the ITA, the 
GAAR is ineffective and the bene t would be allowed.
b. Non-covered treaties44
Under a non-covered agreement, additional analysis is required to 
determine if a gain that is taxable under Canadian domestic law is exempt 
as “treaty protected property.”
Canada’s nine non-covered tax agreements45 will not be affected by 
the MLI and will continue to operate under their existing rules.46 The 
application of Canada’s anti-avoidance regime under these agreements 
would generally proceed in the following order47:
1. Are there any domestic speci c ITA rules that apply?
2. Does the GAAR apply to the domestic provisions?48 
subparagraphs (d)(i) to (iv) (real or immovable property situated in Canada, Canadian 
resource properties, timber resource properties, and options or interests in property whether 
or not the property exists).
42. Under the ITA, when the taxpayer holds under 25% of public shares, they are not considered 
taxable Canadian property. If we reconsider the hypothetical and Holdco’s ’s holding remains 20% for 
at least 60 months and then the disposition is made, the sale would then be exempt.
43. International Tax Planning, supra at note 26 at 198.
44. See Appendix A: Table 2 for a list of Canada’s non-covered agreements.
45. Those not listed by Canada who are signatories of the MLI, or those who are not signatories to 
the MLI.
46. This list includes Germany and Switzerland. Canada is in negotiations with Germany and 
Switzerland, and it is likely these treaties will become MLI covered agreements when negotiations are 
complete.
47. Using Canadian legislative interpretation principles, domestic provisions will likely apply before 
international ones and utilizing paramountcy, speci c provisions will apply before general principles 
(generalia specialibus non derogant).
48. In RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc v The Queen, 1997 CarswellNat 400, 97 DTC 203 (TCC), 
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3. Is there a speci c anti-avoidance rule in the treaty?
4. Is there a general anti-avoidance rule in the treaty?
5. Does the GAAR apply?
Assuming the shares continue to meet the de nition of taxable Canadian 
property at the time of disposition by the non-resident, the gain will remain 
taxable in Canada under four of the nine non-covered agreements.49 In 
the treaties with Germany, Switzerland, Venezuela, Uzbekistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan, however, any gain on shares will be exempt from Canadian 
tax under the speci c wording of the treaties if shares are listed on an 
approved stock exchange.50
Notwithstanding a speci c treaty exemption, the gain under any of 
these treaties may remain taxable in Canada as the result of a speci c 
avoidance rule in the tax treaty. For example, the anti-conduit rules in the 
treaties with Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Kyrgyzstan may apply to deny 
treaty bene ts. The treaty with Germany also includes a general anti-abuse 
rule that could be used to deny treaty bene ts.51 Finally, in appropriate 
circumstances, the CRA might consider the GAAR.52 
Assume as in MIL that the continuance into any of the seven treaty 
countries by Holdco was an admitted avoidance transaction undertaken 
to bene t from the treaty exemption.53 Does it constitute an abuse of the 
treaty? Based on Canadian case law to date the answer remains no and the 
treaty exemption would not be denied by Canadian courts. As stated in 
MIL, the selection of a treaty to minimize tax is not abusive on its own, as 
what matters is the use of the treaty.54 
the Tax Court held that that Minister’s assessment was sustainable under ss 84 and 212 of the ITA, 
in addition to being sustainable under the GAAR but application of the GAAR was unneeded in the 
circumstance. 
49. Canada would have full authority to tax in the Ecuador, Taiwan, and the United States. The 
Canada–Guyana Treaty does not contain an article addressing capital gains in which case there may 
be a danger of double taxation.
50. Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Canada and Germany, 19 April 
2001, at art 13(4): “gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of (a) shares 
(other than shares listed on an approved stock exchange in the other Contracting State).”
51. Under the treaty with Germany, Canada can rely on a treaty based anti-avoidance rule to deny 
a bene t. Art 29(6) states, nothing in the agreement can be construed as preventing the states from 
denying bene ts where it can reasonably be concluded that there would be an abuse of the provision 
or domestic law. The provision has yet to be used in a Canadian context, so its practical effect is 
unknown. Given its broad wording, it is a tool that no doubt will be well utilized if treaty abuse is 
suspected.
52. For example, if there is a no-tax scenario (likely Switzerland) or a loss consolidation regime that 
could lead to a reduction or no taxed paid.
53. MIL (Investments) SA v Canada, 2007 FCA 236, FCJ No 885 [MIL Investments FCA].
54. MIL Investments, supra note 4 at para 72.
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c. MLI-covered agreements 
As of 1 January 2020, Canada’s active covered agreements55 include the 
OECD’s minimum standard including the PPT and the new preamble that 
speci cally references treaty-shopping arrangements.56 The analysis under 
MLI covered agreements will proceed in the same manner as under  a 
non-covered treaty with the addition of the following question: how does 
the MLI apply to the treaty? An analysis of the PPT would be undertaken, 
unless an alternate anti-avoidance scheme under the MLI applied. This 
analysis would generally occur before consideration of the GAAR.
For purposes of the immediate discussion, assume Canco is a private 
(not a public) corporation.57 The Canco shares remain taxable Canadian 
property.58 Absent treaty relief, the gain on disposition by a non-resident 
will be taxable in Canada. Holdco, now a Luxembourg resident, would 
look to Article 13(4) of the Canada–Luxembourg treaty for an exemption 
to avoid Canadian tax.
For Canada to maintain its right to tax the gain, Holdco must have a 
substantial interest in Canco (10% or greater) and the value of the shares 
must be derived principally from real or immoveable property in Canada.59
Assume that Holdco owns 9.99% of the Canco shares and the requirements 
for an exemption under the treaty are met. Also assume for purposes of the 
discussion that the gain is also exempt from tax in Luxembourg.60
55. The MLI will apply to withholding taxes on covered agreements where the MLI has come into 
effect in both jurisdictions, and 1 June 2020, for all other taxes. For countries where the MLI still needs 
to be rati ed the MLI will not cover withholding taxes until the  rst day of the next calendar year of 
the MLI coming into force, and for all other taxes six months after the latest date it comes into force.
56. Canada has chosen to not make a reservation pursuant to art 7(15)(b) of the MLI, and per 
art 7(17)(a) has noti ed the OECD that the PPT shall supersede or replace existing similar provisions, 
see Status of List of Reservations and Noti cations upon Deposition of the Instrument of Rati cation, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, 29 August 2019 at 22.
57. The change from a public to a private corporation is made because an exemption for capital 
gains on publicly traded shares was added under art 13(4) in 1999 to the Canada–Luxembourg Treaty. 
If Canco were publicly traded, the capital gain would be taxable in Luxembourg only and the CRA 
would have limited recourse to challenge.
58. The de nition of TCP includes shares of a private corporation principally deriving their value 
from real or immoveable property in Canada within a  ve-year period. See Act, supra note 24 at 
s 248(1) “taxable Canadian property.”
59. Even if the substantial interest limit is exceeded, there are two limitations: First, if it is a publicly 
listed corporation, and second, if business was carried out on the real or immoveable property from 
which the shares derive their value (see Alta Energy, supra note 7.) 
60. For Holdco to also receive a tax exemption under Luxembourg corporate law, Holdco would have 
to meet that country’s qualifying shareholding requirements. For the purposes of this hypothetical, 
9.99% is treated as meeting a Luxembourg exemption. Under current Luxembourg corporate law, 
eligible entities can be tax exempt if: 1. The shareholding constituted at least 10% of total ownership in 
the share capital or an acquisition price of at least €6 million and, 2. The company held the qualifying 
shareholding for at least 1 year, see Wim Pot, “Luxembourg, Corporate—Income Determination” 
(06 December 2018), Worldwide Tax Summaries, pwc.
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To prevent this complete avoidance of tax, the CRA would look to its 
arsenal of tax avoidance rules. There are no speci c domestic ITA rules to 
challenge the transaction, nor speci c treaty rules. The GAAR was also 
soundly rebuffed in MIL Investments in similar circumstances. In that 
case, the Federal Court of Appeal held that even if the move by Holdco 
to Luxembourg was an avoidance transaction, there was no abuse of the 
tax treaty. There was no abuse because the treaty speci cally provided 
an exemption for non-residents on the gains from the disposition of treaty 
exempt property. 
The shares held by Holdco in Canco are also treaty exempt property. The 
court concluded in MIL that there is no reason to look behind compliance 
with the relevant provisions of the treaty to  nd an object or purpose whose 
abuse would justify departure from the plain words.61 Would the result be 
different under the MLI?  Will the new preamble and the PPT change the 
result in MIL or cause the courts to reach a different result based on the 
facts in the hypothetical posed? As discussed, the new wording introduced 
in the preamble alone is unlikely to change the outcome in MIL or operate 
to deny the bene t in the hypothetical. The preamble itself does not create 
obligations that are not expressly stated, nor does it overpower clear and 
unambiguous speci c provisions in the treaty.62 It cannot “function in a 
manner that would override speci c treaty provisions.”63 
The preamble does send a strong message that a purpose of the treaty 
is to prevent tax evasion and avoidance including through treaty shopping 
arrangements, but that is not suf cient on its own to override the clear 
language in speci c provisions of the treaty under current Canadian law. 
This leaves the application of the new PPT to combat the treaty bene t.64
Procedurally the PPT can be broken down as follows:
1. Evaluate all the relevant facts and circumstances to determine 
the transaction or arrangement that is at issue and the bene t 
given under the treaty, in addition to determining the relationship 
between the transaction or arrangement and the bene t;
2. Determine the principle purpose of the transaction or arrangement;
3. Deny a bene t if one of the principal purposes of a transaction or 
arrangement was to obtain the bene t; and 
61. MIL Investments, supra note 4 at para 6.
62. Relevance of the Preamble, supra note 15 at 6.
63. Ibid at 8.
64. Authorities do not necessarily have to rely on domestic anti-avoidance rules. This could allow 
for situations where the PPT applies before speci c ITA anti-avoidance rules. See International Tax 
Planning, supra note 26 at 960. Such an approach would, however, be contrary to the traditional rules 
on the construction and application of laws in Canada.
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4. Grant the bene t if it was in accordance with the object and 
purpose of the relevant treaty provisions.65
Although the language used in the PPT is similar to the GAAR, there 
are, or there may be, some substantial differences between the two anti-
avoidance provisions.  
The  rst potential difference is establishing what is to be included 
in determining “the transaction or arrangement at issue.” It has been 
suggested that there would be a narrower interpretation under the PPT than 
under the GAAR, which includes a deeming rule to include contemplated 
related transactions.66 The other view is that the court’s interpretation of 
what is included in a series of transactions for purposes of the GAAR 
would produce the same results under the PPT.67 This view is supported by 
the OECD Commentaries which provide that the expression “arrangement 
or transaction” within the PPT is to be construed broadly and includes a 
“more elaborate series of transactions.”68 For the purpose of the current 
discussion it is assumed that all of the transactions in the hypothetical facts 
will be included in determining the transaction or arrangement at issue 
under the PPT.
The second difference is that the PPT looks to whether one of the 
principal purposes was to obtain a bene t. This is a subjective test. In 
MIL, the Court questioned the NRT, who plainly stated that the reason for 
the move to Luxembourg was for business reasons relating to operating 
a mining company in addition to tax reasons. Unlike the test under the 
GAAR, an admission that one of the principal purposes of the decision 
to move Holdco was to obtain a tax bene t is enough under the PPT to 
deny the bene t.  However, under the PPT there is an additional step. 
The PPT will not apply to deny the bene t, if granting the bene t was in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provision. 
65. Svitlana Buriak, “The Application of the Principal Purpose Test under Tax Treaties,” Tax Treaty 
Entitlement (Vienna: IBFD, 2019) 1 at 29 [Application of the PPT].
66. Nathan Boidman & Michael N Kandev, “Canada Enacts Multilateral Instrument: What Happens 
Next?” (2019) taxnotes international, 95:4 at 319.
67. The Supreme Court’s position in Copthorne restricts the term in such a way that a natural 
meaning of “series” for purposes of the GAAR would be functionally the same as “all relevant facts 
and circumstances” for purpose of the PPT and would include related events (with some nexus to 
the series) meant to achieve a planned or pre-ordained result. At paragraph 43 of Copthorne, the 
Court makes clear that a series is a pre-ordained set of transactions to produce a  nal result including 
contemplated related transactions in s 248(10), and that more than a “mere possibility” of a connection 
with related transaction must exist, speci cally that the transaction be undertaken “in relation to” 
or “because of” the series. This does not need to be a “strong nexus” but does require a nexus, see 
Copthorne, supra note 9 at paras 43-47. 
68. See OECD, Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, (OECD Publishing, 
2010) Commentary of Article 29(9) at para 177; Application of the PPT, supra note 65 at 31.
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This is a third difference from the GAAR. Under the GAAR, the CRA 
must establish inter alia that “granting the bene t is not consistent with 
the object, spirit or purpose of the provision.” Under the PPT the taxpayer 
must objectively show “that granting the bene t is in accordance with the 
object and purpose of the speci c provision.”69 Although this puts the onus 
on the taxpayer, it also gives the taxpayer the opportunity to make a full 
case. Is the granting of the treaty bene t in keeping with the object and 
purpose of the relevant treaty provision—in this case an exemption from 
Canadian tax on a capital gain under Article 13? As stated in both MIL and 
Alta Energy, Article 13 of the tax treaty was written with full knowledge 
by both parties of their respective domestic tax systems and to encourage 
investment in each jurisdiction. From the Canadian perspective, Article 
13(4) provides for speci c exemptions that were contemplated by both 
Governments (in position papers).70As expressed on two occasions by the 
courts,71 the Government of Canada has the power to renegotiate more 
speci c provisions in the treaty and the government chose not to do so. 
If a speci c treaty provision is plainly worded to allow, for example, a 
Luxembourg investment vehicle to buy and sell Canadian stocks, injecting 
cash into the Canadian economy, it follows that granting the tax bene t 
to a taxpayer that does so would be in line with object and spirit of the 
provision.
Overall, the PPT appears to offer a broad net to catch transactions 
that fall through the cracks in existing Canadian anti-avoidance rules. 
Nonetheless, the  nal test to allow or deny treaty bene ts within the PPT, 
based on whether the bene t is in accordance with the object and purpose of 
the relevant treaty provisions, logically mimics the analysis in the GAAR. 
One wonders why the outcome in treaty shopping cases would be any 
different when applying the PPT unless a very non-Canadian approach is 
taken by the Courts in applying the provision, or different rules are applied 
to determine the object, spirit and intent of a treaty provision.
d. Does the GAAR apply? 
Will the anti-avoidance provisions in the MLI lead to a different conclusion 
under the GAAR? The GAAR analysis will now presumably incorporate 
all aspects of a transaction and will include all aspects of the tax treaty, 
69. This is especially important as Canada has reserved its right to not include art 7(4) of the MLI in 
its covered tax agreements. This would have permitted the competent authorities to provide some or 
all bene ts denied under the PPT.
70. Joint Book, Vol IX, Tab 117, at p 3016 in Alta Energy, supra note 7 at paras 42-45.
71. MIL Investments, supra note 4 and Alta Energy, supra note 7.
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including the new preamble and the PPT.72 Is the new preamble enough 
to alter the outcome under the GAAR?73 Recall that treaty shopping was 
not referenced in MIL or Alta Energy. It is now speci cally referenced in 
Canada’s 84 covered treaties. Based on current Canadian law the outcome 
is unlikely to change based on the preamble alone and the taxpayer would 
remain successful.74
Assuming a bene t and an avoidance transaction are found for 
purposes of the GAAR, does the application of the PPT change anything? 
Under both anti-avoidance rules the critical question is whether the bene t 
is consistent with the object, spirt and intent of the treaty provision. 
Canadian courts have made clear that this determination should not be 
con ated with a value judgment of what is right or wrong nor with theories 
about what tax law ought to be or ought to do.75
Tax treaties are entered into by Canada to encourage investment. The 
court explicitly made this point in 2018 in Alta Energy.76 Countries are 
presumed to know and understand each others’ tax systems when they 
make treaties, and the Canadian government was free to negotiate a 
provision to stop this activity if it wished.77 Unless there was evidence 
led by the CRA that the Government did not intend this type of planning, 
it should be considered to be within the object and purpose of the treaty 
and a side-effect of encouraging investment in Canada’s natural resources 
(even if it is not agreeable to taxation authorities). If the government of 
Canada hopes to curtail bene ts such as the receipt of tax-free capital 
72. Under a GAAR analysis the court would  rst determine the object, spirit, and purpose of the 
provision or provisions at bar by applying the “uni ed textual, contextual, and purposive” analysis. 
Second, the Court must then consider if the transaction “falls within or frustrates the identi ed 
purpose.” This is an examination of the factual context of the case to determine whether the transaction 
or series as a whole, achieves an outcome that the statutory provision was intended to prevent; defeats 
the underlying rationale of the provision; or circumvents the provision in a manner that frustrates or 
defeats its object, spirit or purpose. See Deans Knight Income Corp v Canada, 2019 TCC 76, TCJ No 
58, at para 139. 
73. This adapts the preamble to state “intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes 
covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through 
tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs 
provided in this agreement for the indirect bene t of residents of third jurisdictions).” See MLI, supra 
note 13 at art 6(1). 
74. As the court stated in Alta Energy, supra note 7 a tax treaty is a multi-purpose legal instrument. 
The preamble of the treaty states that the two governments desired “to conclude a Convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of  scal evasion with respect to taxes on income 
and on capital.” While indicative of the general purpose of the treaty, this statement remains vague 
regarding the application of speci c articles of the treaty. Under the GAAR analysis, the Court must 
identify the rationale underlying Articles 1, 4 and 13, not a vague policy supporting a general approach 
to the interpretation of the treaty as a whole.
75. Copthorne, supra note 9 at paragraphs 69 and 70.
76. Alta Energy, supra note 7.
77. Alta Energy, supra note 7 at para 85.
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gains by foreign investors on the disposition of Canadian source assets, the 
Court’s position appears to be that the government must negotiate changes 
to the tax treaty that demonstrate a clear intention to do just that. In short, 
while there may be a general policy against treaty shopping, it cannot be 
automatically inferred that it should operate to prevent a taxpayer from 
using a speci c and clearly worded treaty provision.78 
e. Foreign domestic GAAR considerations 
Many of Canada’s covered agreements are with countries that have their 
own general anti-avoidance rule. If the tax structure or arrangement 
involves an ongoing transaction between the covered treaty country and a 
third country, these GAAR provisions may apply in addition to the PPT. 
For example, the European Union GAAR, now in force in Luxembourg,79
includes a PPT and commercial purpose test.80 As recently noted by 
commentators, there are also a number of substance requirements that will 
have to be met under both Luxembourg and EU law.81
From the EU perspective, there could be much less reliance on the 
PPT than in Canada.82 The EU GAAR may in fact be broader than the MLI 
PPT as there is not a reasonableness standard included in the wording of 
the provision.83 Thus, Luxembourg or another EU state could resort to the 
78. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada, 2005 
SCC 54, 2 SCR 601 at para 1, citing Mathew v Canada, 2005 SCC 55, a general policy is “but 
one consideration to be taken into account in determining Parliament’s intention with respect to a 
particular provision or provisions of the Act.”
79. As of 1 January 2019, the Anti-Avoidance Directive (ATAD) GAAR has been transposed on 
member state GAARs.  See Antonio Weffer & Amar Hamouche, “Luxembourg Adopts the ATAD as 
well as Two other Important Provisions” (24 December 2018), online: Baker McKenzie Publications 
<https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2018/12/luxembourg-adopts-the-atad> 
[https://perma.cc/9RS6-B7CL] at 5. “The tax burden cannot be circumvented or reduced through the 
misuse of forms and institutions of private law,” and “entitles tax authorities to levy tax according to 
the effective economic operations, facts and circumstances.”
80. Richard Collier et al, “Dissecting the EU’s Recent Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures: Merits and 
Problems” (August 2018) vol 2, EconPol Policy Report, [EU’s Recent Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures] 
at 12. ATAD imposes two requirements: 1. For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, 
a Member State shall ignore an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into 
place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the 
object or purpose of the applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part, and 2. For the purposes of 
paragraph 1, an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as non-genuine to the extent that they 
are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which re ect economic reality.
81. This can include active professional boards in Luxembourg with the capacity to act for the 
company, quali ed personnel, and key decision making occurring in Luxembourg, see Oliver Hoor, 
“The Concept of Substance in a Post-BEPS World” (2019) taxnotes international at 593-597.
82. The EU GAAR was constructed as a direct response to BEPS Action 6 which called for the 
implementation of a PPT in the OECD model treaty and grew into the current MLI PPT, see OECD 
Model, supra note 19.
83. EU’s Recent Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures, supra note 80 at 12. 
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GAAR before the application of the PPT under the treaty. If the bene t is 
granted under the GAAR it is unlikely that the PPT under the treaty would 
deny a bene t.
The situation is not the same with Canada’s other large trading partners. 
In the case of the UK, for example, the GAAR is similar to the Canadian 
GAAR, and may thus be viewed as the broader rule. This contrasts with 
China, where the GAAR follows speci c domestic ordering rules that could 
force its application before the PPT. It is likely that the implementation of 
the MLI will force a case by case analysis of the interaction of domestic 
GAARs, and their order of application for planners. 
2. Hypothetical 2 
The second hypothetical examines tax avoidance issues in two Canadian 
tax treaty cases, Prevost Car (2009) and Velcro (2012). At issue in 
both cases is whether the reduced tax treaty withholding rate applies to 
passive income (dividends or royalties) paid by a Canadian corporation 
(Canco) to a non-resident corporation (Holdco) and then by Holdco to a 
third corporation.  In both cases the CRA argued that Holdco was not the 
bene cial owner of the payments as required by the tax treaty. In the CRA’s 
view, the term ‘bene cial owner’ in this context means the person who can 
ultimately bene t from the payment. In both cases the Court rejected the 
CRA’s interpretation of the meaning of bene cial ownership under the tax 
treaties in question. At the time of the decisions there were no anti-treaty 
shopping provisions in the relevant tax treaties. Two questions are posed.
1. Would the same result occur today under a non-covered tax 
treaty?84
2. Would the same result occur under the new MLI regime or will the 
CRA (or foreign competent authorities) use the preamble, the PPT 
(or any other provision) to deny the lower tax treaty withholding 
rate on such payments in similar circumstances?
a. Background 
In Prevost Car, UKco and Swedenco formed a joint holding company 
in the Netherlands, Dutchco, that held all shares of Canco. Under the 
arrangement Canco paid its dividends to Dutchco and withheld the 5% 
treaty rate under Article 10(2) of the Canada–Netherlands Tax Treaty, as 
opposed to the domestic withholding rate of 25%.85 Dutchco then paid 
out dividends to both UKco and Swedenco respectively.86 The 5% rate 
84. See Appendix A Table.
85. Act, supra note 24 at s 212(2)(a).
86. There was no speci c legal contract between Dutchco and its shareholders obligating it to 
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would not be available if Canco had paid the dividends directly to UKco 
or Swedenco.
The CRA reassessed the withholding tax rate on dividend payments 
made to Dutchco claiming it was not the bene cial owner of the dividends 
and therefore Dutchco was not entitled to treaty bene ts.87 Both the Tax 
Court and the Federal Court of Appeal88 disagreed.89 The Tax Court 
outlined the Canadian position on the meaning of bene cial ownership 
under a tax treaty as follows: “the ‘bene cial owner’ of dividends is the 
person who receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment 
and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she received.”90
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Tax Court’s position stating that 
the Crown was seeking to “adopt a pejorative view of holding companies 
which neither Canadian domestic law, the international community nor the 
Canadian government through the process of objection, have adopted.”91
This position was echoed by then ACJ Rossiter in 2012 in his decision in 
Velcro.92 The Velcro decision also added further clarity to the bene cial 
ownership test.93 In all three decisions the courts also refused to pierce the 
corporate veil, opining that they would only consider that option if the 
corporation had no discretion whatsoever over the funds.
distribute dividends, instead the parents signed a shareholder’s agreement stipulating they would 
receive 80% of net pro ts from Canco and Dutchco.
87. Prevost Car, supra at note 6 at paras 1-26.
88. Prévost Car Inc v Canada, 2009 FCA 57, [2009] at 241 [Prevost Car FCA]. 
89. At the time of Prevost Car, two experts, Professors Dr. S van Weeghel and Rogier Raas provided 
evidence that under Dutch law Dutchco was the bene cial owner of the shares. Evidence was led by 
Prevost’s counsel in the case that highlighted a difference of opinion between Canadian and Dutch 
authorities that led to a break in communication between the parties as the Dutch authority recognized 
Dutchco as the bene cial owner; only if there was a legal obligation to forward the dividends would 
Dutch law ignore Dutchco as bene cial owner (Prevost Car, supra note 6).
90. Ibid at para 100: “The person who is bene cial owner of the dividend is the person who enjoys 
and assumes all the attributes of ownership. In short, the dividend is for the owner’s own bene t and 
this person is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the dividend income.” 
91. Prevost Car FCA, supra note 88 at para 15.
92. Velcro Canada Inc v Her Majesty The Queen, 2012 TCC 57, [2012] DTC 1100, [Velcro] at paras 
1-14.
93. In Velcro, supra note 92, Canco paid royalties under a license agreement to VIBV, a Netherlands-
resident corporation. VIBV relocated to the Netherlands Antilles and created a subsidiary holding 
company, Dutchco, in the Netherlands. VHBV then assigned their licenses to Dutchco. After this 
change, Canco paid its royalties and withheld 10% of its payments to Dutchco. Under an agreement 
between VIBV, and Dutchco, VIBV was paid an arms length percentage of the net sales of licensed 
products within 30 days of Dutchco receiving royalties. The CRA again denied the bene t of the lower 
tax treaty rate under the Canada–Netherlands Treaty. The Tax Court outlined the test that would be 
applied to determine if Dutchco had bene cial ownership over the royalty funds: possession, use, risk, 
and control. Essentially, in Velcro the Court asks if the Holdco exercises dominion and the qualities of 
ownership over the funds they are receiving or are they merely a  duciary that is completely obligated 
and at the direction of another who exercises control over the funds? As in Prevost, the Court found 
that Dutchco had discretion and ownership over the funds even with contracts between the parties.
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b. Non-covered agreements
Since Prevost and Velcro were decided, the OECD Commentaries provide 
an interpretation of “bene cial ownership” that looks to “the full right 
to use and enjoy the [income] unconstrained by a contractual or legal 
obligation to pass the payment received to another person.”94 This invites 
two questions. Will the revised commentary be applied in Canada to 
determine the meaning of bene cial ownership for tax treaty purposes? 
If so, does this proposed formulation of the “bene cial ownership” test 
make it more dif cult to satisfy than the bene cial ownership test applied 
in Prevost and Velcro Canada and would it change the result? In summary, 
the answer to the  rst question is yes and to the second question no. These 
answers are discussed below.
The Federal Court of Appeal made clear in Prevost that modern 
commentaries written after the signing of the treaty may be used where 
they are eliciting or complementary to views previously expressed at the 
time of the treaty’s creation, but not if they are contradictory.95 The revised 
commentary on Article 10 now speci cally addresses the use of an agent, 
nominee, and conduit company as circumstances where the recipient’s 
right to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal 
obligation to pass the payment on to the ultimate bene ciary.96 
If the OECD commentary is applied by Canadian courts would it 
change the result in Prevost97 or Velcro?  Likely not. Bene cial ownership 
will still be found with the DutchCo.98 However, that is not the end of the 
matter. The OECD Commentary in Article 10 goes on to provide:
94. 2012 amendments to the OECD Commentary. “In these various examples (agent, nominee, 
conduit company acting as a  duciary or administrator), the direct recipient of the dividend is not 
the “bene cial owner” because that recipient’s right to use and enjoy the dividend is constrained by a 
contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person. Such an obligation 
will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on the basis of facts 
and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly does not have the right to use and 
enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment received 
to another person.”
95. Prevost Car FCA, supra at note 88 at para at para 12.
96. This can also include a fact speci c analysis of the circumstances to ascertain if the recipient had 
a constrained right to use and enjoy the dividends; See OECD Model, supra note 19 at 234, para 12.4.
97. See Appendix A.
98. As the federal Court of Appeal pointed out in Prevost Car FCA, supra note 88 at para 16, 
Dutchco:
1. did not possess an agency or  duciary relationship with the parent companies;
2. did not possess a conduit relationship as it had discretion with what to do with the funds; 
3. was not subject to action from the parent companies if it did not follow the dividend policy 
set out in the shareholder’s agreement; 
4. was not party to the shareholder’s agreement;
5. did not have a legal obligation to pay the dividends;
6. was obligated to follow Dutch law paying dividends and paid for and owned the shares so 
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The fact that the recipient of a dividend is considered to be the bene cial 
owner of that dividend does not mean, however, that the limitation of 
tax provided for by paragraph 2 must automatically be granted. This 
limitation of tax should not be granted in cases of abuse of this provision 
(see also paragraphs 17 and 22 below). As explained in the section on 
“Improper use of the Convention” in the Commentary on Article 1, there 
are many ways of addressing conduit company and, more generally, 
treaty shopping situations. These include speci c anti-abuse provisions 
in treaties, general anti-abuse rules and substance-over-form or economic 
substance approaches. Whilst the concept of “bene cial owner” deals 
with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition 
of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to someone else), 
it does not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not, 
therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the application of 
other approaches to addressing such cases [emphasis added].
Has there been an abuse of the treaty provision for purposes of any 
Canadian anti-avoidance provision including the GAAR? Under Canadian 
law the answer remains no.99 This would leave only the application of the 
MLI avoidance provisions, including the PPT to potentially deny a bene t 
under a covered agreement. This issue is discussed below.
c. MLI-covered agreements:  Canada–Netherlands (EU) 
The PPT requires the courts to evaluate the relevant facts and circumstances 
to determine the transaction or series and the relationship between the 
bene t and the transaction or series. If a bene t is found, it must be shown 
that granting the bene t is in accordance with the object and purpose of 
the treaty provision. It is critical, therefore, to determine what is within the 
object and purpose of the provision at issue.
It is clear from the commentary that it is not within the object and 
spirit of the provision to provide a treaty exemption for agents or nominees 
or for conduit corporations; in the former case because there is no taxation 
in the host country, in the latter because the conduit receives the bene t for 
someone else. If it is contrary to the object and purposes of the provision 
to provide treaty bene ts to one who is not the bene cial owner of the 
dividends, the court’s interpretation of the concept of bene cial ownership 
concept will remain key in determining whether a treaty bene t is granted 
under the MLI. 
Will Canadian courts follow past precedent in interpreting the concept 
of bene cial ownership in a treaty context or embrace a broader meaning 
when it received dividends, they were available to its creditors until an interim dividend 
was declared. 
99. Treaty shopping was speci cally not found to be abuse in Alta Energy, supra note 7 and MIL 
Investments, supra note 4.
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under the PPT to prevent so-called treaty shopping arrangements? This 
would require that Canadian judges answer questions such as—What is 
treaty shopping?  Does it exist on a spectrum of avoidance-abuse?  Where 
is the bright-line between using treaties to gain bene ts as is their express 
purpose in business planning and planning into abusive treaty shopping 
arrangements?
It is more likely that Canadian courts will continue to interpret the 
concept of bene cial ownership based on Canadian case law. Echoing the 
decision in MIL, the parties were aware of what they saw as a  aw in the 
provision based on each state’s taxation system, and they took no action to 
correct it in the treaty.100 
The application of the PPT to the facts in Prevost would proceed as 
follows: the transactions will include the creation of Dutchco by Swedenco 
and UKco, the payments of dividends to Dutchco by Canco using the 
5% treaty withholding rate, and  nally the payment of dividends from 
Dutchco to both parents (likely tax-free under the EU’s Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive). The purpose(s) of the transaction were elaborated on by a senior 
Vice-President of Swedenco who stated the motivations were taxation, 
a neutral territory between the UK and Sweden, an English-speaking 
business market, and a location that was cost ef cient. Under part three 
of the PPT, the bene t would be denied because accessing preferential 
treaty withholding rates was one of the admitted and main purposes. The 
taxpayer would then have to show under part four, that granting the bene t 
was in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty provision in 
order to preserve the bene t.
The taxpayer would argue that the object and purpose of the treaty is 
to encourage investment by providing reduced withholding tax rates on 
dividends paid to their bene cial owners. Dutchco is the bene cial owner of 
the dividends under the treaty and the bene t should therefore be allowed. 
The CRA would no doubt counter that it is not the object and purpose of 
Article 10(2) to allow a corporation without any physical presence in the 
Netherlands to access a treaty withholding rate, erode the Canadian tax 
base, and provide the funds to non-resident parent corporations who have 
higher treaty withholding rates with Canada, and a tax-free distribution 
within the EU. The new preamble introduced under the MLI adds weight 
to the argument that one of the purposes of the treaty is to prevent treaty 
shopping. 
100. Granting a reduced withholding rate is the very purpose of the treaty and in the absence of a 
positive response by state actors to change the treaty the bene t should be granted.
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Based on Canadian case law to date, it seems more likely that the 
PPT would not operate to deny the bene t in MLI covered agreement 
transaction. If Dutchco is in fact the bene cial owner of the dividends, a 
more speci c anti-avoidance rule such as a modi ed or detailed limitation 
of bene t provision would be required. 
d. Netherlands considerations 
Canada’s position is not the only one that should be considered by business 
and planners.  In the Prevost hypothetical, the Netherlands could block the 
bene cial treaty rate on the second set of dividends paid from Dutchco 
to the other EU entities (Swedenco and UKco). Whether the Netherlands 
would be successful will depend on Dutch law, an area of expertise outside 
the scope of this paper. Nonetheless some general observations can be 
made.
First, the dividends will be exempt from withholding tax between EU 
countries if the conditions set out in the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
are met. Second, the European Court of Justice recently passed judgement 
on a set of bene cial ownership cases and attempted to provide clarity on 
“bene cial ownership” in tax treaties between EU member states. These 
cases, as noted by commentators, have moved the EU towards a common 
understanding of bene cial ownership in tax treaties between member 
states covered by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.101
Third, in treaties between non-EU and EU states containing Article 
3(2), each state will still look to a domestic law de nition. There is no 
domestic de nition of bene cial ownership in Dutch Tax Law.102 This 
would lead a court to look at the de nition of “uiteindelijk gerechtigde,” 
the Dutch term in the translated treaty, which literally means “he who 
is ultimately entitled.”103 In either case Dutchco would be considered the 
bene cial owner of the dividend without a distinct legal obligation to pay 
dividends to the parent companies.104  
101. Jonathan Schwarz, “Bene cial Ownership: CJEU Landmark Ruling” (27 February 2019), 
online: Kluwer International Tax Blog <http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/02/27/bene cial-ownership-
cjeu-landmark-ruling/?doing_wp_cron=1587757382.0886158943176269531250> [https://perma.cc/
JHX7-MZWL].




103. Prevost Car, supra note 6 at para 81.
104. Florian Navisotschnigg, “The Bene cial Ownership Test,” Tax Treaty Entitlement (Vienna: 
IBFD, 2019) 1 at 116.
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e. Treaty speci c anti-avoidance rule 
As previously discussed, 43 of Canada’s 93 tax treaties include an anti-
conduit rule that operates to deny treaty bene ts in de ned circumstances. 
For example, in Canada’s treaty with Hong Kong, the anti-conduit rule 
applies to all of the income articles.105 In the case of Taiwan, the rules apply 
to the entire treaty.106  The operation of the provision is straightforward 
and provides a clear test for denying treaty bene ts. If Canco distributes 
dividends to HKco who in turn distributes dividends (under the same non-
legal obligation) to its non-resident shareholders, HKco will be denied 
access to the bene ts of the treaty on the distribution unless the tax rate 
it pays in Hong Kong is the same as if its shareholders were Hong Kong 
residents. 
3. Hypothetical 3
The  nal hypothetical looks at tax ef cient arrangements commonly 
used by Canadian businesses to  nance their foreign subsidiaries, often 
referred to as double-dip  nancing. Double-dip  nancing allows for an 
interest deduction in Canada and an interest deduction in the foreign 
jurisdiction where the active business subsidiary is located on a single 
sum of loaned money.107 More complicated double-dip arrangements 
include “Tower Structures” that allow for the deduction of interest costs 
by the Canadian corporation for Canadian tax purposes and the deduction 
of the corresponding interest costs by the foreign subsidiary for foreign 
tax purposes  without the payment of withholding tax on the repatriation 
of the funds.
A tower structure was before the Tax Court in the case Bank of 
Montreal v The Queen.108 In that case, BMO lent $1.4 USD to its BMO 
Harris Group through three entities. First it invested the funds in a Nevada 
limited partnership, which then invested in a Nova Scotia unlimited liability 
company, which in turn invested in a Delaware limited liability company, 
who  nally lent the money to BMO Harris.109 BMO Harris gained an 
105. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of The People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Canada and Hong Kong, 
11 November 2012, art 26(3).
106. The bene ts are denied if an entity is bene cially owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
one or more persons who are not residents of the entity’s state of residence, if because of non-resident 
ownership or control, the amount of tax imposed on the entity is less than it would be if the owners 
were resident that state.
107. Brian J Arnold, “Double-Dip Financing Arrangements,” Taxation of the foreign-Source Income 
of Canadian Residents, (2009) 9 at 9:2.
108. Bank of Montreal v The Queen, 2018 TCC 187, TCJ No 138 [BMO].
109. BMO, supra note 108 at paras 4-16.
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interest expense when it paid interest to the Delaware LLC. The Delaware 
LLC sent dividends backwards through the chain ultimately arriving back 
with BMO in Canada. BMO Canada also gained an interest expense from 
the original loan with the third party. The Minister agreed that the tower 
structure complied with the ITA.110 The question posed is: does the PPT 
provide foreign competent authorities with new opportunities to challenge 
double-dip  nancing structures affecting their jurisdiction? 
Assume for purposes of the discussion that a Canadian subsidiary, 
Luxco, is in Luxembourg and another, Fraco, an active business corporation, 
is in one of Europe’s higher tax zones, France. Canco borrows $5 million 
from a lender in Canada which it uses to purchase shares in Luxco. Luxco 
subsequently loans $5 million to Fraco. 
a. Luxembourg–France tax treaty 
Under Article 10(1) of the Luxembourg–France Treaty, interest is only 
taxable in the state where the interest is received.111 This would allow 
Luxco to receive the interest fully exempt from any French withholding 
taxes. Here, although interest  ows are not subject to withholding tax, they 
are subject to an arms-length reasonability requirement under Luxembourg 
domestic law.112 There is a second hurdle that would have to be jumped. 
Article 28 of this treaty adds a principle purpose test for entitlement to 
bene ts, the wording of which is the same as the PPT contained in the 
MLI.113 Luxco must demonstrate to French revenue authorities that one 
of its principal purposes was not to obtain the 0% withholding tax rate 
between jurisdictions. This will be a signi cant hurdle, and the  rst of two 
instances where the transaction will be scrutinized under a PPT. It will 
not be hard for French authorities to show one of the principal purposes 
of the series was to obtain a 0% interest withholding tax as that is part of 
the double-dip  nancing scheme. France could also use their GAAR to 
attempt to block the bene t should the treaty fail to do so.114 
110. The structure was challenged under the GAAR for other reasons, although the minister was 
unsuccessful, see BMO, supra note 108 at para 15. 
111. “New Double Tax Treaty between Luxembourg and France” (22 March 2018), online: PwC 
Flash News <https://www.pwc.lu/en/tax-consulting/docs/pwc-tax-220318.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/3HUQ-3VRQ] at 4 [New Treaty].
112. Ibid. 
113. New Treaty, supra note 111 at 7.
114. As previously stated, the new European GAAR contained in ATAD is almost identical to the 
rule contained in art 28 of the treaty: “no account will be taken of an arrangement or a series of 
arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of 
obtaining a tax bene t that is contrary to the object or purpose of the applicable legal provisions, are 
not genuine considering all relevant facts and circumstances.”
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The interest received by Luxco would then be paid as a dividend back 
to Canco. There is unlikely to be a treaty challenge in Canada given the 
nature of the  nancing scheme which is allowed under Canadian law.
b. Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty 
Under Article 10(2) of the Canada–Luxembourg Treaty, dividends are 
subject to a reduced withholding rate of 5%. Under a double-dip  nancing 
structure, the dividend paid from a subsidiary back to its parent in Canada, 
if paid out of an exempt surplus pool,115 will not be taxed in Canada.116
This 5% treaty withholding rate is the only tax the dividends would face 
on repatriation to Canada.117 
Under the MLI, the PPT will serve as a tool that Luxembourg 
authorities could use to prevent the lowered withholding rate. Practically, 
this would seem unlikely as Luxembourg has bene ted from corporate and 
municipal taxes on Luxco’s income.118 
The bottom line is that businesses operating under MLI-covered 
agreements may now be subject to multiple PPT tests, particularly in cross 
border  nancing arrangements. Where jurisdictions are not favourable to 
this type of  nancing arrangement treaty bene ts may be denied.
Conclusion: Limited change from the status quo 
When Canada agreed to implement the PPT as a minimum standard 
in its covered agreements there was a large degree of uncertainty as to 
how much change would be on the horizon for Canadian international 
business. After assessing the hypotheticals in this paper, it appears that 
the minimum standard introduced by the MLI is unlikely to change the 
analytical approach to tax treaty transactions in Canada from the previous 
GAAR approach. For the most part the status quo will remain.
Though Canada’s GAAR will likely still be a consideration when cases 
are brought before the courts, it will more likely be the PPT that will decide 
the matter under covered agreements. If the transaction or arrangement 
115. Act, supra note 24 at s 113(1)(a), allows for the full deduction of dividends received from a 
foreign af liate’s “exempt surplus” arising from active business income. 
116. Act, supra note 24 at s 95(2)(a).
117. As a reminder, the interest faced no withholding tax leaving France and entering Luxembourg. 
Nor would Canada tax the dividend when it entered Canada. The only taxes that arise are Luxembourg 
domestic corporate and municipal taxes on Luxco, and the 5% exit withholding rate. 
118. If subject to a second PPT, it would have to be shown that one of the primary purposes for making 
the transaction was not the reduced withholding rate. As this is the second leg of the transaction there 
would be greater scrutiny as there are more parts of the series authorities could analyze including 
the interest payment from FraCo. Though unlikely, Luxembourg could stop the lowered withholding 
rate using the PPT should they be able to show that the lowered rate was one of the primary purposes 
(which was a major consideration in the double-dip scheme as a whole) and that granting the bene t 
was not the object or spirit of the provision (allowing for a treaty shopping double-dip arrangement).
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satis es the GAAR’s object, spirit, and purpose test then in most cases 
the PPT will be satis ed as well. As demonstrated in the discussion of 
Prevost and Velcro, courts might have the option of adopting a different 
viewpoint in the PPT’s object and purpose analysis but even then, it is 
likely they will come to the same conclusion they would under GAAR. 
Additionally, by merely adapting the preamble of tax treaties to reference 
treaty shopping, the preamble’s in uence over substantive provisions of 
the treaty is limited. As discussed throughout this paper, the preamble, in 
international and domestic law, is viewed only as a contextual framing 
mechanism and is not in and of itself substantive. It will be left to the 
courts to determine how they will tackle treaty shopping.  
In many cases the application of the PPT as a minimum standard will 
be temporary, and Canada will adopt a DLOB provision in its tax treaties 
similar to that found in the Canada-United States Treaty. This will lead 
to further certainty. Until DLOB provisions are negotiated, the following 
should be kept in mind: 
1. The PPT will live next to existing rules and will likely be used as 
a catch-all where domestic anti-avoidance, treaty anti-avoidance, 
and GAAR have failed to deny a bene t; 
2. On a plain reading of the PPT, most tax bene ts under a treaty will 
be denied in part three of the PPT. However, part four of the PPT, 
—is the bene t in accordance with the object and purpose of the 
treaty provision, is the most crucial element of the PPT; 
3. If the GAAR does not operate to deny a bene t because the bene t 
is in line with the object, spirit, and purpose of the provision, then 
the same result is likely under the PPT.
4. The PPT applies to a series of transactions according to the OECD 
commentary. The series used in the GAAR analysis is likely the 
same as the series that will be scrutinized under the PPT;
5. The tax regime in the other country involved in the transaction 
should be a major consideration in both the planning for and 
arguments against the PPT. Object and purpose under the PPT will 
logically be similar in form to GAAR and require an understanding 
of the practical tax and policy positions of both governments;
6. In situations where unique terms such as bene cial ownership 
are used, the PPT may produce a different result than GAAR if 
the courts give more preference to international law and OECD 
commentaries then domestic jurisprudence has allowed; 
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7. When dealing with the European Union, the PPT and ATAD 
GAAR are complimentary to one another. Should one be satis ed 
the other surely is as well;
8. For  nancing structures such as double-dips, the result will 
likely be the same under the PPT in Canada as under our existing 
system, but the PPT will provide multiple opportunities to 
challenge double-dip structures in jurisdictions less favourable to 
the practice; and
9. As in most law, judicial personalities will be key to the application 
of the PPT and how Canada initially responds to it. If current trends 
continue it is unlikely that Canadian Courts will respond with a 
heavy hand in applying the PPT unless the abuse is abundantly 
clear.
To quote T.S. Elliot, the MLI is unlikely to come onto the Canadian legal 
stage with a bang, instead it shall arrive with a whimper. 
The MLI entered into force in Canada on 1 December 2019, and into 
effect on 1 January 2020 for many covered agreements.119 Notwithstanding 
that the PPT will be the ultimate decision maker in covered agreements, it 
is unlikely to alter results previously seen under the GAAR. 
The primary concern raised by the Department of Finance in its 2013 
Treaty Shopping Consultation paper remains: Is there strong enough 
language being used in legislation to prevent treaty shopping?120 As this 
paper has shown, the answer is no. It is unlikely that the MLI, as currently 
implemented by Canada, will satisfy Finance’s legislative goal. The 
introduction of DLOB provisions will be required.
119. Withholding taxes on covered agreements where the MLI has come into effect in both 
jurisdictions, and 1 June 2020, for all other taxes. For countries where the MLI still needs to be rati ed 
the MLI will not cover withholding taxes until the  rst day of the next calendar year of the MLI 
coming into force, and for all other taxes six months after the latest date it comes into force.
120. “Collectively, these three cases (MIL, Prevost, Velcro) indicate in relatively strong terms that the 
courts in Canada are not currently inclined to  nd against taxpayers in treaty shopping cases. In other 
words, the courts in Canada require clearer legislative direction to the effect that treaty shopping is 
an improper use of Canada’s tax treaties,” see Canada, Department of Finance, “Consultation Paper 
on Treaty Shopping—The Problem and Possible Solutions,” (August 2013) online (pdf): Department 
of Finance <https://www.thor.ca/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Consultation-Paper-on-Treaty-
Shopping.pdf> [https://perma.cc/R4N5-QEUG]. 
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Appendix A
Table 1: Canadian Covered Tax Agreements
Treaties Covered by the Convention (84) 
Algeria Estonia Latvia Russia 
Argentina Finland Lithuania Senegal 
Armenia France Luxembourg Serbia 
Australia Gabon Malaysia Singapore 
Austria Greece Malta Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Hong Kong Mexico Slovenia 
Bangladesh Hungary Moldova South Africa
Barbados Iceland Mongolia Spain 
Belgium India Morocco Sri Lanka 
Brazil Indonesia Netherlands Sweden
Bulgaria Ireland New Zealand Tanzania 
Cameroon Israel Nigeria Thailand 
Chile Italy Norway Trinidad and Tobago
China Ivory Coast Oman Tunisia 
Colombia Jamaica Pakistan Turkey 
Croatia Japan Papua New Guinea Ukraine
Cyprus Jordan Peru United Arab Emirates
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Philippines United Kingdom 
Denmark Kenya Poland Vietnam
Dominican 
Republic Kuwait Portugal Zambia
Egypt South Korea Romania Zimbabwe 
Status of List of Reservations and Noti cations at the Time of Signature, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, 30 May 2017, <http://
www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-canada.pdf> 
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Table 2: Canadian Treaties Not Covered by the MLI Convention 











Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Pro t Shifting, Status as of 29 
August 2019, OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-
and-parties.pdf >
